Advanced Course on Matching

Instructor:
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Dates: July 17 - 21, 2017, Monday-Friday, 3½ hour lectures every day. 9:30-13:00

Course Description
The mini-course will provide an overview of some recent research and policy work on matching markets. The focus of the course is the evolution of the literature both from a theoretical and also practical perspective. Topics include two-sided matching, house allocation, school choice, kidney exchange, matching with contracts, and cadet branching.

Course Outline

1. House Allocation & Housing Markets
Roth and Postlewaite (1977), Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods, Journal of Mathematical Economics 4, 131-137.

2. Kidney Exchange


3. School Matching

Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, by A.E. Roth and M.A.O. Sotomayor, Cambridge University Press, 1990, Chapters 2, 3 and 5, (background reading.)

Sönmez and Ünver (2011), "Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources", J. Benhabib, A. Bisin, and M. Jackson (eds.) Handbook of Social Economics, Elsevier, 2011, Chapter 4, (background reading.)


Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003), School choice: A mechanism design approach, American Economic Review 93, 729-747.


4. Cadet-Branch Matching

Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), Auctions, Matching and the Law of Aggregate Demand,
American Economic Review, 95, 913-935, (background reading.)

Hatfield and Kojima (2010), Substitutes and Stability for Matching with Contracts,

594-601.

Sönmez and Switzer (2011), Matching with (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at United States
Military Academy," Boston College working paper.

Sönmez (2011), Bidding for Priorities: Improving ROTC Branching Mechanism," Boston
College working paper.